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TRUTH COMMISSIONS AND NATIONAL RECONCILIATION:   
SOME REFLECTIONS ON THEORY AND PRACTICE 
 
Charles O. Lerche III 
 
For countries just emerging from a struggle against oppression and tyranny the first 
challenge is whether to blindly forgive past oppressors or hunt them down and punish them. 
Often there seems to be a choice between reconciliation or justice, instead of attaining a 
balance between the two. 
      International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance, 1998b 
 
Justice in itself is not a problematic objective, but whether the attainment of justice always 
contributes to reconciliation is anything but evident. Truth, too, is a good thing; but as the 
African proverb reminds us, 'truth is not always good to say.  
     Ignatieff, 1996 
 
Introduction 
The “Post-Cold War” world presents staggering contrasts.  On the one hand, the threat of 
annihilation has receded, totalitarianism seems to be in retreat and there is greater interest in such 
issues as sustainable development, human rights and good governance.  On the other hand, however, 
political and economic instability seem chronic in many regions, and there is a sense of drift both 
within many countries and at the global level.  Prominent on the “new agenda” of world politics is 
the apparent rising tide of communal conflicts around the planet:  a trend which has both positive 
and negative aspects.  Communalism is a threat to both the material and ideational foundations of the 
nation-state, and potentially, to the entire international status quo;  but precisely because communal 
conflicts so often turn violent and have proved resistant to traditional methods of containment and  
resolution, they have stimulated the search for more innovative, more comprehensive, and more fully 
human approaches to dealing with conflict. 
Reconciliation as a technique which goes beyond settling a conflict’s material stakes to 
restoring social relations and healing hearts and minds, has received increasing attention in recent 
years, largely  because of the high profile Truth Commissions  in places like Chile, Argentina, 
Brazil, El Salvador, Haiti and, most prominently, South Africa.1  All of these bodies have proceeded, 
at least nominally, on the premise that shared truth was essential for social reconciliation.  Over 
time, however, it has become increasingly clear that true “national reconciliation” is very 
challenging in countries attempting to make rapid transitions from authoritarian to liberal democratic 
rule.  In most cases, there is a tension, if not a full-blown contradiction, between the officially 
proclaimed need for reconciliation and the capacity of the state to provide justice to the victims of 
past wrongs.  The long term healing, stability and development of many societies may well depend 
on the degree to which this contradiction can, at least to some degree, be resolved. 
In what follows the concept of reconciliation, as developed by Joseph Montville (1998) and 
others, is introduced and its contemporary application in the context of democratizing societies 
examined.  In this regard, the tension between justice and reconciliation, as represented by the 
conditions of amnesty granted in several countries to the perpetrators of human rights abuses, is 
highlighted as a subject of concern in the practice of truth commissions.  In addition, the difficulties 
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of establishing a "national truth” are considered.  Subsequently, the paper considers what measures 
could assist in promoting further national reconciliation, and the emerging consensus about values of 
 a “global civic culture”  is explored as a promising source of more proventive long-term approaches 
to dealing with conflict.  
 
Reconciliation:  the concept and its application 
Violence, perceived injustice and negative stereotyping have combined over extended 
periods of time to render many contemporary conflicts inaccessible to standard non-violent 
resolution processes.  In these situations violence, either latent or manifest, has become the status 
quo and any lasting change can only follow a transformation of the various dynamics underlying that 
status quo.  Reconciliation is promoted by its theorists and practitioners as just such a tool of 
transformation.  There is some breadth of definition of this concept in the literature which the 
following selection of citations tries to capture: 
 
Reconciliation is currently essential to the construction of sustainable peace.  It can 
be defined as a profound process of dialogue between conflicting parties, leading to 
the recognition of the “other” , and respect for his or her differences, interests and 
values (International Year for Reconciliation, 1998b). 
 
Reconciliation is “the action of restoring broken relations”  (International Year for 
Reconciliation, 1998a). 
 
Reconciliation is..."the acknowledgment of the dignity of victims for long ignored.  It 
restores the individual’s capacity to take hold of herself and to manage the future and 
herself in that future.  It restores the capacity to live with or alongside the other.  It 
allows us, while remembering, to bring closure to a chapter in our past.  It enables us 
to live in the present, making our life as a nation and our lives as individuals in a 
shared future.  It always remains a never-ending process" (Commissioner Wynand 
Malan of the South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission, cited in 
“Reconciliation by Understanding,” 1997). 
 
 Montville, who has studied the psychological effects of political violence in some depth, 
explains that those who have suffered unjustified violent attacks have an enduring fear of their 
trauma re-occurring; a fear which undermines the possibility of developing renewed trust in their 
victimizers, and inhibits any true negotiation or eventual (re)integration with them (Montville, 
1998).   Thus, in regard to most communal conflicts time does not “heal all wounds.”  Instead,  
grievances associated with unacknowledged and unforgiven wounds are passed down the 
generations, creating a widening gap of estrangement, fear and hatred, which increases the 
likelihood of  further violent conflict and aggravates its intensity.  Montville (1998) mentions 
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Catholics in Northern Ireland, Anatolian Armenians, European Jews during World War II, 
Palestinian Arabs after 1948, Poles and Ukrainians as examples of peoples for whom “victimhood is 
an integral part of their identity.”  True healing according to Montville can only come through 
reconciliation which involves a sequence of three steps: 
 
1.  Acknowledgment.   When oppressors publicly acknowledge what they have done, 
knowledge becomes, in a sense, truth, and victims are (to some extent) assured that the past 
will not repeat itself.  This in itself is contributes to victims' healing and, thereby, facilitates 
dialogue.  However, as Montville (1998) points out:  “The act of acknowledgment to be 
effective must be complete and detailed.  The victim cannot accept the omission of any 
painful episode of loss by the acknowledging side, otherwise the good faith of the 
acknowledgment will be suspect.”  
 
2.  Contrition.  The next step is to take responsibility for past actions, to express regret, and 
to directly request forgiveness. Again, sincerity, as judged by the victims, is the key to the 
success of this step.   
 
3.  Forgiveness.  The first two steps by the oppressor/aggressor prepare the ground for the 
final psychological step, which is the victim’s voluntary forgiveness of past injuries.  It may 
take time for victims to express their forgiveness, but  true acknowledgment and contrition 
by the other side will in themselves have a positive effect on relations between the parties 
(Montville, 1998). 
 
Montville envisions reconciliation occurring in specially designed “workshop” contexts 
where participants from both sides feel secure, and trained neutral third parties conduct various 
therapeutic exercises such as “walks through history.”  Reported results indicate that this kind of 
intimate, small-scale activity can bring about real transformation in attitudes and relationships 
among former enemies.  However, where aspects of the reconciliation process have been applied at 
the national level to entire societies the results, while positive in certain respects, are on the whole 
more ambiguous.  At present, states trying to get beyond their dark pasts seem to inevitably face a 
cruel short-term tradeoff between reconciliation and justice. 
 
Truth Commissions and Reconciliation 
Truth commissions have emerged in most cases as part of transitions from some form of 
authoritarian government (military or civilian dictatorship, or minority rule) toward a more 
democratic political system in societies often characterized by serious divisions along class or 
communal lines.  Richard Wilson (1998) describes them as “... post-war structures for publicly 
addressing unresolved issues arising from past human rights violations”, which “...typically consist 
of an investigative team with a mandate to take testimonies, corroborate evidence, document human 
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rights abuses and make recommendations regarding structural reforms and reparations.” They have 
been established either through legislation or presidential decree to achieve a defined and delimited 
task, and they are dissolved once they have reported their findings.   
Truth commissions can be seen as important milestones on the road toward democracy.  The 
extensiveness of a commission’s  mandate, the thoroughness of and public support for its inquiries 
and the impact of its report (if any) are all indicators of the relative strength of the new political 
order.  The data on various commissions presented in the Appendix reflects just how diverse 
national experiences with truth commissions, and related bodies, has actually been.  Even a cursory 
comparison of the various cases reveals significant differences in regard to: 
 
Purpose.  Besides exposing the truth of human rights abuses, some seemed intended to show 
the current regime’s immediate predecessors in a bad light (Ethiopia, Haiti) 
 
Time period investigated.  While some commissions investigated periods as brief as 3-4 
years (Haiti), several examined one or more decades of their nation’s history (Chile, 
Germany, and South Africa among others). 
 
Documentation.  Several commissions documented thousands -- and in a few instances tens 
of thousands -- of cases of abuse (Chile) while others found very few (Bolivia). 
 
Reporting.  Some commissions have issued no report (Bolivia, Philippines) or a report which 
was kept confidential (Zimbabwe).  In some cases those responsible for abuses were named 
(El Salvador, Honduras) and in others they were not (Uruguay). 
 
One of the most controversial aspects of truth commissions has been the granting of amnesty. 
 Though amnesty has not occurred in all countries, it has been prominent in just those cases where 
the commissions have been regarded as most thorough in their inquiries.  On balance, it almost 
seems that some sort of amnesty has been a necessary prerequisite for a commission to contribute to 
national reconciliation.  This is exemplified by the Chilean case, where the military under former 
Head of State General Pinochet only accepted the Truth Commission on the condition of amnesty 
and a compromise in which the maximum truth about “disappearances” could be reported but 
judgment on whether the deaths were justified was left to “individual discretion”(Green, 1996).  
Despite these seeming equivocations the Chilean truth commission is assessed by many human 
rights experts as having dealt with past issues in such a way as to contribute to national 
reconciliation (Human Sciences Research Council, 1998). 
 
South Africa:  Both Truth and Reconciliation?  
The variety, and sometimes contradictory, commentary on the work of South Africa’s Truth 
and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) also reflects ambivalence about the real connection between 
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the commission and national reconciliation.   While the commission was in session an impression 
was created that "wounds of the past" were somehow being healed.  Much of this was, no doubt, due 
to the extensive national and international media coverage of the commission's activities.   Winslow 
(1997) for instance, explains that as a result of being "...deluged with newspaper reports of detailed 
human rights violations on a daily basis.." White South Africans have been forced to face the fact 
that “... old norms, myths and beliefs no longer hold true...” (Winslow, 1997), while for blacks their 
suspicions were validated and elaborated.   Certainly, in the course of its work the Truth 
Commission has provided a context for many individual incidents involving acknowledgment, 
contrition and forgiveness, the three steps in Montville's model of reconciliation. Most importantly 
perhaps is Winslow’s (1997) conviction that the TRC represents a major watershed in South African 
history:  “...because of the TRC, there is no turning back. The nation must now adapt to the new 
norms and realities about its history, restructure its cognitive processes, and move on from the past.”  
Some psychologists have, however, warned against assuming that public “truth telling” leads 
to both individual and national healing: 
There is a popular assumption that the TRC provides the space for a cathartic release 
of emotions that can form the basis for psychological healing - for individual 
deponents and for society as a whole. But this is questionable. Can we talk about 
individual healing in the same breath as national healing? Are the processes different 
or the same? 
If we speak of helping individuals and society to 'heal' we must have at least a 
working definition of the ailment or injury; we must be sure that the 'cure' leaves the 
afflicted individual or society better and not worse off. In attempting to answer this 
question, it is crucial to establish whether there is a valid comparison between the 
cognitive and therapeutic processes that affect the 'society' and the 'individual' (de 
Ridder, 1997). 
 
Furthermore, despite the willingness of many victims to forgive, the granting of amnesty and 
uncertainty over reparation payments are real and potentially explosive issues in South Africa today. 
 Some commentators, while agreeing that amnesty was a necessary and pragmatic compromise to 
permit the TRC to delve into human rights violations,  feel it was not made clear that this was an 
"evil" compromise.  In the worst case, this could contribute to the impression that the TRC has 
favored perpetrators over victims; an impression strengthened "...by the sense that at present it 
appears as though perpetrators have more to gain by receiving amnesty than victims have through 
reparation. Reparation seems distant as it will only occur once the TRC is over and there is no 
guarantee of what form it will take" (Hambler, 1998).  Though the South African case has several 
unique aspects, similar problems exist in other countries trying to make the transition from a closed 
to a more open system of government. 
 
Truth in Transition 
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The possibility that national reconciliation may  be getting higher priority than justice and 
healing for individuals, raises disturbing questions.  What sort of reconciliation is it that leaves many 
personal wounds untreated?  In this regard the expression “forgive and forget” takes on a new and 
perhaps sinister meaning.  While forgiveness is certainly healthy, it is far from clear that a nation 
should ever forget even the most painful aspects of its past.  Writing about the major commissions in 
Latin America, Ignatieff (1996) has argued that “false reconciliation” is a danger worth taking 
seriously: 
 
The record of the truth commissions in Latin America has disillusioned many 
of those who believed that shared truth was a precondition of social reconciliation. 
The military and police apparatus survived the inquisition with their legitimacy 
undermined but their power intact. The societies in question used the truth 
commissions to indulge in the illusion that they had put the past behind them. The 
truth commissions allowed exactly the kind of false reconciliation with the past they 
had been expressly created to forestall.  
The German writer and thinker Theodor Adorno observed this false reconciliation at 
work in his native Germany after the war:   '"Coming to terms with the past" does not 
imply a serious working through of the past, the breaking of its spell through an act 
of clear consciousness. It suggests, rather, wishing to turn the page and, if possible, 
wiping it from memory. The attitude that it would be proper for everything to be 
forgiven and forgotten by those who were wronged is expressed by the party that 
committed the injustice (emphasis added).  
 
 A fuller appreciation of the difficulties of blending principle with pragmatism can be gained 
if one sees truth commissions in the broader context of democratization.  Sørensen (1993), a 
specialist in this field, has written that the most important influence on the outcome of 
democratization in a given country is the nature of the coalition promoting the change.  As he 
(1993:44) explains:  “The crucial distinction is between transitions dominated by the elites who were 
also behind the old, authoritarian regimes [i.e. transitions from ‘above’] , and transitions in which 
mass actors have gained the upper hand [i.e. transitions from ‘below’].”  To date, the majority of 
democratic transitions in countries with truth commissions has clearly been “top down.”   They have 
most often been precipitated by a crisis in the previous authoritarian government, in response to 
which the ruling coalition divided into those wanting to continue the old style of rule despite the 
crisis, and those who felt a process of democratization could bring such benefits as renewed 
legitimacy (both at home and abroad) or more international investment.  In this scenario at least 
some old elites remain in positions of power and they will only accept institutional arrangements 
which do not adversely affect their interests to any significant degree.  Sørensen (1993:47), in fact,  
argues that this type of transition can result in the creation of “restricted democracy” characterized 
by: 
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...the presence of elite groups whose members reserve the right to interfere in the 
democratic process in order to protect their interests.  In the case of democratic 
transitions from above, such interference can be part of the actual basis of the whole 
movement toward democracy.  In other words, the elite groups (the military, 
traditional economic elites, and leading politicians) may make the transition toward 
democracy dependent on the acceptance of a set of agreements, or political pacts, 
that define vital areas of interest for the elites. (emphasis in original).  
 
He also sheds light on the amnesty issue discussed above, citing the case of Argentina where the 
new democratic government under Raúl Alfonsin tried to bring the military to account for its past 
actions before a court.  Unfortunately, this was more than the military would accept, and in the wake 
of the military rebellions of 1987 Alfonsin had to stop most efforts to try military officers (Sørensen, 
1993:  49-50). 
Karl, writing primarily about Latin America, argues in a similar vein that any democratic 
transition based on a “foundational pact” between the government and the opposition is to some 
degree problematic since the pact  inevitably restricts representation in the new system to protect the 
position of the dominant classes.   In the final analysis, he (1990: 11-12) characterizes these pacts as: 
 “...anti-democratic mechanisms, bargained by elites, which seek to create a deliberate 
socioeconomic and political contract that demobilises emerging mass actors while delineating the 
extent to which all actors can participate or wield power in the future.” Commenting on Karl’s 
judgment, Pinkney (1993) (summarizes the positive and negative aspects of this path to 
democratization.  He (1993: 142) explains that precisely because of the concessions made: 
“...transition by pact scores highly in terms of consensus, at least at the elite level, and stability, but 
poorly in terms of the prospects for equality and mass participation, and leaves a built-in elite veto in 
place.” However, one should not conclude that the new system is only different in form, rather than 
substance, from the old.  Rather, in the new democracy there will most likely be an end to arbitrary 
arrest, torture and execution; there may be more freedom for trade unions; and, perhaps most 
important over the long term, the electorate acquires the power to remove unacceptable leaders 
(Pinkney, 1993). 
 This assessment suggests another question:  truth commissions are based on the premise that 
there is one truth, but how realistic is this assumption during a top-down transition?  Post-modernist 
critique has made us aware that social truth is always contested, and in a “dirty war” all sides have 
their versions of the truth.  Where truth commissions have not been allowed to fix blame for the acts 
they document, the “truth” of the security forces--  i.e. that they were engaged in putting down 
insurgencies--cannot be refuted.  Besides different versions of the truth, there are also different 
dimensions of truth: “ One should distinguish between factual truth and moral truth, between 
narratives that tell what happened and narratives that attempt to explain why things happened and 
who is responsible.  The truth commissions had more success in establishing the first than in 
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promoting the second” (Ignatieff, 1996).   Ignatieff (1996) in fact suggests that for communal 
conflicts, the past cannot be exposed and reified once for all; rather:  “The past is an argument and 
the function of truth commissions, like the function of honest historians, is simply to purify the 
argument, to narrow the range of permissible lies.”  
 
Guatemala:  “top down” and “bottom up” truths 
The case of Guatemala further highlights several of these points.  The various accords and 
commissions tasked with looking into human rights abuses in that country have been far from 
completely satisfactory, and the most significant of these, the Commission for Historical 
Clarification (CEH)2, was clearly limited by the realities of a war-torn society and a transitional 
state. Wilson lists five clauses of the accord creating the CEH which he feels “...undermine its 
potential for challenging impunity and promoting the rule of law” (Wilson, 1998): 
 
(1)  the stipulation that only abuses “linked to the armed conflict” should be investigated, 
which means that illegal acts against those not connected to either side could be considered 
outside the brief of the Commission; 
(2) the Commission’s existence was limited to six months, which is an impossibly short time 
to investigate several decades of events; 
(3) the Commission was charged with making “objective judgements about events during the 
period under consideration”, which is understood to mean that the security forces and the 
rebels should be held equally responsible for violence; 
(4) the Commission was extremely weak, having no powers (in contrast to the TRC in South 
Africa) of search, seizure or subpoena; and 
(5) the Commission “will not individualise responsibility, nor have any legal implications” 
which means that no names would be included in the Commission’s report and no 
Commission findings could be used in later legal proceedings. 
 
The Commission was further hobbled by a serious lack of funds.  The government had initially 
intended to allocate only $50,000 to the Commission, but under pressure the figure was increased to 
$800,000.  However, the Commission’s Head, German law professor Christian Tomuschat, was 
obliged to delay the Commission’s work until he could find substantial international financial 
backing (Hegstrom, 1997).  Also, though a “Comprehensive Accord on Human Rights” had been 
concluded in 1994 which contained strong anti-impunity provisions, in 1996 rebels and government 
negotiators agreed on amnesty terms which came into effect in 1997 in the, ironically titled, “Law of 
National Reconciliation.”  
Several civil society organizations have participated in the work of revealing the truth in 
Guatemala, and most prominent among these was the Catholic Archbishop’s Human Rights Office 
(ODHA) which carried out the “Recovery of Historical Memory” (REMHI) project.  The REMHI 
project’s report, entitled “Guatemala:  Never Again” and completed in April 1998, documented more 
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than 55,000 documented human rights violations, and it claims that during the period under study:  
“...150,000 people died, 50,000 ‘disappeared,’ one million became refugees, 200,000 children were 
orphaned and 40,000 women became widows” (A War Called Peace:  Images of Guatemala, 1998).  
Most importantly, the REMHI project named both perpetrators and victims on both sides of the civil 
war.  Thus, it has both complemented the CEH and served to further highlight its shortcomings 
(Wilson, 1998).  The gap between the “truth” of the officially sanctioned commission, and that of 
this more extensive civil society initiative was dramatically demonstrated by the murder of  
Monsignor Juan Gerardi Conedera.  Gerardi, bishop of the Archdiocese of Guatemala, was the 
Coordinator of the ODHA and the driving force behind the REMHI; and just two days before his 
death he participated in the presentation of REMHI’s final report.  Though government officials call 
the killing a common crime, human rights activists see it as a reprisal for demands made at the 
presentation ceremony for justice based on the report’s findings.  It also seemed to confirm popular 
suspicions that, despite government denials, death squads continue to operate in the country (A War 
Called Peace, 1998). 
The Guatemalan context was also shaped by a United Nations human rights presence, which 
made several important contributions to improving the human rights climate during the transition 
from military rule.  However, as the transition advanced some commentators felt there was tension 
between the U.N.’s role in promoting human rights and its role as mediator and verifier of the 
Guatemalan peace accords.  Thus, in April 1998 the United Nations Human Rights Commission 
ended its probe into human rights abuses, despite widespread objections from various humanitarian 
organizations.  This decision gave rise to speculation that the U.N. was so concerned with validating 
the transition to democracy that it was willing to make concessions on human rights issues.  The 
effects of the decision are potentially far reaching, since in its wake the Guatemalan armed forces 
can once again buy weapons internationally and receive foreign military assistance (Zubieta, 1998).  
Finally, it should be noted that the murder of Archbishop Gerardi did not cause the United Nations 
to alter its judgment. 
 
An Alternative to Courts 
Though truth commissions very likely promise more than they can deliver, what they can 
deliver, as described above by Pinkney, is very  significant.  This is further illustrated by considering 
the differences between truth commissions and courts.  It must be remembered that commissions are 
instituted in countries where the legal system had been, one way or another, perverted in such a way 
as to permit human rights abuses to occur, and even be “justified.”  The new order emerging out of a 
“top down” transition simply does not have, as clearly demonstrated by the Argentine case, the 
institutional capacity to right the wrongs of the past through the rule of law.  Truth commissions 
represent, therefore, an imperfect but politically viable alternative way for a people to raise and 
examine at least some of the shortcomings in the human rights practice of their legal systems and 
security forces.  Commenting on his country’s experience, South African lawyer Richard  Penwill 
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(1997) argues that the difference between the TRC and a court is, in many ways, the key to its 
success: 
 
The TRC is not, and was not intended to be, a court of law. It was not created to 
make a judgment; it was created to help ventilate the evidence, establish the truth and 
bring about reconciliation. Unlike a court it does not aim at a conclusion so much as 
a process....Ironically it is these non court-like characteristics that have enabled us, 
the general public, to hear a wide ambit of evidence which has raised questions about 
the role of the courts, police and instruments of law and order and justice in our 
society.  
 
Penwill goes on to illustrate this point using the example of TRC testimony in which a policeman 
confirmed the past use of the infamous “wet bag” torture by demonstrating how it was applied.  This 
technique had been used frequently to illegally extract confessions which led to convictions of  
people for serious offenses they did not commit.  Though the defendants regularly claimed that their 
confessions had been obtained under duress, there was no corroboration and the courts were obliged 
to accept the confessions as evidence (Penwill, 1997).  Now all of South Africa has proof of the 
“justice” system being used for injustice and oppression, and by implication, everyone has seen the 
need for a new legal order which clearly distinguishes itself from past practice.  Again, commissions 
cannot themselves reform institutions, but they can help create a climate in which true reform may 
become possible.   
Furthermore, truth commissions seem to have contributed more, to date, to national 
reconciliation than war crimes tribunals.   It is often argued that the two recent war crimes tribunals, 
for the former Yugoslavia and for Rwanda, have proved too slow in their operations to meet the 
demands of justice, and that they lack the means to ensure that many known criminals stand trial.  
Writing about the Great Lakes region of Africa, Vandeginste (1998) explains that:   
 
The International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) was set up not only to 
prosecute persons responsible for serious violations of international humanitarian 
law between 1 January and 31 December 1994 but with the belief that prosecutions 
‘will contribute to the process of national reconciliation and to the restoration and 
maintenance of peace.’  
However, he concluded (in 1997) that :  “Three and a half years later, it is becoming increasingly 
clear that the ICTR will not be able to contribute significantly to national reconciliation” 
(Vandeginste, 1998).  The Guatemalan experience also seems to confirm the view that formal justice 
procedures are too slow and politically charged, and as Wilson (1998) explains:  
 
...a maximalist ‘Nuremberg option’ for addressing war crimes is not even remotely 
possible in Guatemala.  This is not to say that the legal route to justice should be 
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abandoned altogether...What is essential is that the limitations of the legal system be 
recognised so that the Commission and other initiatives can complement its work. 
 
This overview of contemporary truth commissions as efforts at national reconciliation 
permits a few concluding observations.  First, it seems clear that an effort at national reconciliation 
cannot be limited to Montville’s (1998) three steps of acknowledgment, contrition and forgiveness.  
Rather, justice has to figure into the process somewhere.  However, it is precisely the inability of 
transitional democratic institutions to provide justice that constitutes the most compelling rationale 
for truth commissions.  This suggests that the long term constructive influence of truth commissions 
is their role as a bridge from a past where justice was denied and a present where it is not yet 
practically and politically possible, to a future where it can, in all its dimensions, become an integral 
part of the social order.  In that sense, a process of national reconciliation must go beyond coming to 
terms with the past to seeking out and implementing more broadly equitable models of governance. 
 
Towards a New Political Culture 
           Several analysts have argued that national reconciliation, whether through Truth 
Commissions or other means, is neither a complete approach to conflict transformation nor an 
adequate end in itself.  Galtung (1998)writes, for instance, that what he calls the “three’s” -- 
resolution, reconstruction and reconciliation -- are all essential to stabilization and progress in post-
conflict situations, and omitting any one will undermine efforts to achieve the other two. In a similar 
vein,  Øberg (1996) describes post-conflict “reconstruction” as involving the reconstruction of “...1) 
human beings, soul and bodies, 2) social structure, 3) culture, 4) environment, and 5) a peace culture 
of reconciliation, repentance, forgiveness, respect...and simultaneously moving toward a vision of 
peaceful coexistence...”  In contrast to such a comprehensive approach to conflict resolution, Øberg 
(1996) mentions the Dayton agreement for Bosnia-Herzegovina which, though stopping military 
activity, does not solve any of the underlying conflicts in the area.  Clements (1997) suggests that 
the keys to “..development of more stable peaceful relationships between people lie in a deepening 
awareness of the key psychological, social and political processes which generate trusting 
communities within which individuals can realize their deepest sense of self.”  These are important 
insights: it is increasingly obvious that the real challenge in most countries attempting reconciliation 
is to build a society which is truly participatory and fulfilling for all groups.  Otherwise, fissures 
giving rise to alienation and deep-seated conflict will emerge in the new order as they did in the old, 
eventually necessitating further efforts at reconciliation ─ efforts which would certainly be greeted 
with more cynicism than enthusiasm. 
In this regard,  Burton’s work on  human needs provides a useful benchmark against which 
plans for “post-conflict” society can be measured.  Burton (1990: 23) starts from the premise  “...that 
there are limits to the extent to which the human person, acting separately or within a wider ethnic or 
national community, can be socialized or manipulated...”; and “...that there are human development 
needs that must be satisfied and catered for by institutions, if these institutions are to be stable, and if 
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societies are to be significantly free of conflict.”  While acknowledging that this is still a new and 
contested research area, Burton presents a plausible list of needs.  First, human beings require a 
sense of security and of identity. Second, since people have a generic drive to learn, they require a 
consistent response from the environment, without which learning is impossible. Third,  from their 
social context people require both recognition and valued relationships, or bonding .  Finally, and 
perhaps most importantly,  individuals require (some) control over their environments in order to 
insure that their needs are fulfilled (Burton, 1990: 47 and 95).  This approach has important 
implications for social institutions.  If, on balance, needs are being met within an institution, the 
institution receives support and is consolidated and perpetuated.  If, however, needs are not met, the 
institution loses support and legitimacy, and confronts increasing opposition.  In the latter case, 
authorities tend to react with repression and coercion, but if an institution  is “de-legitimated” for 
enough people, conflict can not be resolved this way.  Rather, the institutional structures have to 
evolve, sooner or later, to more fully accommodate the needs of the people they affect.   
To Burton (1990: 127), legitimacy is a dynamic, rather than a static, condition which 
“stresses the reciprocal nature of relations with authorities, the support given because of the services 
they render, and respect for legal norms when these are legitimized norms.”  He (1990: 127) 
contrasts this with a static notion of  legality which “...has associated with it...loyalty to a sovereign 
or formal leader right or wrong, elitism, the common good and the national interest as interpreted by 
elites...”  From this perspective, national reconciliation would not be complete until the social and 
political order was popularly perceived as legitimate.  Though such legitimacy is currently  
considered to inhere in liberal democratic institutions,  Burton (1998: 4) has recently argued that 
conventional representative democracy is only effective in a society with “...relative ethnic 
homogeneity, classlessness and equality...”; and this model alone is not able to guarantee 
institutional legitimacy  “...in a society that contains major income differences, and in which 
minorities are unrepresented but must observe the norms of a majority”-- conditions characteristic of 
many transitional countries.   In summary, Burton’s work indicates that social reform which goes 
further than conventional Western models of governance to meet human needs is necessary if the 
deep-seated conflicts of war-torn societies are ever to be transformed into peaceful and creative 
relations among the groups concerned. 
There is, in fact, a widening consensus among human needs theorists, human rights 
advocates, international organizations concerned with development and peace researchers about the 
requisite qualities of such a new social order.  Consider the United Nations Development Program’s 
(UNDP) “five aspects of sustainable development”3 
 
  Empowerment - The expansion of men and women’s capabilities and choices increases their 
ability to exercise those choices free of hunger, want and deprivation.  It also increases their 
opportunity to participate in, or endorse, decision-making affecting their lives. 
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  Co-operation - With a sense of belonging important for personal fulfillment, well-being and 
a sense of purpose and meaning, human development is concerned with the ways in which 
people work together and interact. 
  Equity -  The expansion of capabilities and opportunities means more than income BB it also 
means equity, such as an educational system to which everybody should have access. 
 
  Sustainability - The needs of this generation must be met without compromising the right of 
future generations to be free of poverty and deprivation and to exercise their basic 
capabilities. 
 
  Security - Particularly the security of livelihood.  People need to be freed from threats, such 
as disease or repression and from sudden harmful disruption in their lives (United Nations 
Development Programme, 1997). 
 
These characteristics closely resemble Burton’s needs.  In a similar vein, the UNDP goes on to 
outline the elements of a governance system which would promote sustainable development, 
suggesting that sustainable development can only be realized through political institutions which 
function according to similar principles (UNDP, 1997).   
The convergence evident here parallels recent advances in the theory and practice of human 
rights.  The Cold War division between the Capitalist camp’s emphasis on civil and political rights 
and the Socialist/Third World preference for social, economic and cultural rights has now been 
recognized as unhelpful and unacceptable.  All five major areas of human rights have been 
acknowledged by the international community  (however grudgingly in some cases) as an indivisible 
whole.  However, as indicated above, rights and the improved quality of individual and collective 
life they represent can not simply be legislated into existence; an understanding reflected in the 
emphasis by many activists and organizations on a “cultural” approach to the problem.  Consider the 
following sample of such initiatives: 
 
1.  The United Nations Educational, Cultural and Scientific Organization (UNESCO), and 
others, are promoting a “Culture of Peace” defined as: “...a set of values, attitudes and 
behaviours which reflect and inspire participatory democracy, social interaction, sharing, 
tolerance, gender equity, solidarity, human rights, the rejection of violence and conflict 
prevention through dialogue” (UNESCO, 1996). 
 
2.  A group of Nobel Laureates is promoting a “Culture of Non-violence”, which would 
encompass love, justice, harmony; reject oppression; and embrace social diversity, non-
violence and personal transformation (Decade for a Culture of Non-Violence, 1998). 
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3. A former United Nations Secretary General promoted the creation of a “universal culture 
of human rights” (United Nations Secretary General, 1989). 
 
4.  The Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance promotes a “Culture of 
Democracy”, which highlights nonviolent conflict resolution, open decision-making, the role 
of civil society, transparency and participation (International Institute for Democracy and 
Electoral Assistance, 1998a). 
 
Finally, the World Commission on Culture and Development draws some far-reaching conclusions 
from this burgeoning consensus.  They believe it provides strong evidence that there is a discernible 
“global civic culture” from which important elements of global ethics can be derived (World 
Commission on Culture and Development, 1996).   These “global ethics” are: 
 
general principles denoting the fundamental moral concern that in a social and 
political community ought to find adequate reflection....the basic moral concern -- to 
protect the integrity and to respect the vulnerability of human beings -- is universal 
in its appeal and can be shown to be part of all major traditions of moral teaching... 
 
In their own formulation, they put forth five principle ideas that should form the core of global 
ethics: 
 
Human rights and responsibilities  
Democracy and the development of civil society 
Protection of minorities 
Peaceful conflict resolution 
Equity within and between generations 
 
These principles, like those cited earlier, reject elitism and give priority to participation in all 
institutions and social programs.  Furthermore, they argue that states, though historically the worst 
violators of these principles, are now under increasing pressure from global civil society and 
international organizations to conform to standards of global ethics both domestically and in 
international relations.  Only then can the dominant pattern of conflict and power politics be 
replaced by something else. 
Returning once more to the Guatemalan case, it is quite clear that such principles figured 
prominently in the peace accords that brought the armed struggle to a definitive conclusion.  As 
Palencia Prado (1998) has explained: 
 
The central concerns of the peace accords include the need to transform existing 
relations between state and society, so that political institutions are capable, for the 
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first time, of mediating the interests of all social groups in a poor, unequal, multi-
ethnic, and multilingual Guatemala.  To achieve this transformation, core provisions 
express time and again the need for participative consultation in the formulation, 
execution, evaluation and monitoring of state policies, and for accountability in 
legislative action and executive decision-making.  In other words a culture of 
involvement in which public decision-making responds to the will of the citizenry is 
clearly promoted in the accords...(emphasis added). 
  
The author goes on, however, to catalogue a number of ways in which political life in the new 
Guatemala either falls short of the ideals embodied in the accords or diverts from them completely.  
Though the country now has  more democratic institutions, a better organized and more extensive 
civil society and distinct support for human rights from the international community, it is clear that a 
complete culture change in the direction of what she calls involvement remains a long-term goal 
demanding unrelenting effort.  However, as argued below, Burton's work indicates that nothing short 
of such an effort can bring stable and creative social  peace to this or any other country in transition. 
 
Conclusion 
Burton has emphasized that there are two fundamentally different approaches to the analysis 
of conflict:  either conflict is due to inherent human aggressiveness and can, at best, be controlled, 
or, as outlined above, it results from inappropriate social institutions that frustrate human needs.  The 
former position justifies coercion and elite control in society, but the latter points out a direction for 
positive change (Burton, 1998: 1).  His analysis is compelling for the countries considered in this 
paper since their historic turning points have been reached through the collapse of overtly coercive 
systems.  This fact, in itself, lends prima facie support to Burton's second premise.  Further support 
is provided by the broad consensus about what values a truly peaceful and democratic society should 
uphold:  a consensus in fact sanctioned by state representatives in the Vienna Declaration on Human 
Rights in 1993 (Human Rights Internet, 1999). 
Truth commissions can be points of departure for a process of transformation towards a civic 
culture which would fulfill rather than frustrate human needs; but they are not enough in themselves. 
 The ambiguities surrounding these commissions and the problems of contemporary political 
development in countries where national reconciliation has been attempted, indicate that far-
reaching challenges are still to be met before successor institutions in transitional societies acquire 
long term legitimacy.    For instance, even assuming good will on the part of leadership, mounting 
evidence indicates that the pace and scope of contemporary economic globalization imposes policy 
choices that sow seeds of further disruptive conflict in transitional societies.4  
 Ultimately, the fate of transitions, whether incorporating formal truth commissions or not, 
may hinge on the degree to which they avoid what Galtung (1995: 12) calls the "one mistake which 
is no longer pardonable:   the single-shot 'table at the top', the high table, for the 'leaders.' "  He 
(Galtung, 1995) goes on to promote another model: " Let one thousand conferences blossom... Tap 
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the insights all over, marginalizing nobody, making peace-making itself a model of structural peace" 
(emphasis added). Thus, if the proliferating institutions of civil society can continue to define and 
focus attention on needs-related issues, such as human rights and sustainable development, and hold 
public institutions accountable for steady progress in these areas, it may be possible to gradually 
complement the original "top down" pact which launched transition with a longer term "bottom up" 
dynamic of social change.  
 
   
Notes 
 
1  Houston Chronicle reporter Tony Freemantle (1997) wrote that as of 1996:  “some kind of 
truth commission charged with investigating past violations of human rights has been used in at least 
14 countries.” 
2  The commission’s full name is:  The Commission for the Historical Clarification of the 
Violations of Human Rights and Acts of Violence which have Causes Suffering to the Guatemalan 
Population. 
3  The UNDP defines sustainable development as: 
…expanding the choices for all people in society.  This means that men and women – particularly 
the poor and vulnerable – are at the centre of the development process.  It also means ‘protection of 
the life opportunities of future generations… and…the natural systems on which all life depends.’ 
(UNDP, Human Development Report 1996).  This makes the central purpose of development the 
creation of an enabling environment in which all can enjoy long, healthy and creative lives (UNDP, 
1997). 
4  Malcolm Waters (1995: 46) has argued, for instance, that the intra-national and 
transnational conflicts generated directly and indirectly by globalization may prove to be “…more 
intractable than the previous disputes between nations.” 
 
Appendix 
 
Examples of Official Commissions of Inquiry 1971 –– 1995  
 
Country 
 
Year 
 
Commission 
 
Result 
 
Bangladesh 
 
1971 
 
Commission on war crimes 
 
30,000 charged after 1971; 
general amnesty 1973 
 
Uganda 
 
1974 
 
Commission of inquiry into 
disappearances 
 
1,000 page report published, but 
no details on individual cases 
 
Brazil 
 
1992 
 
Human rights council Said 111 detainees in Sao Paolo 
wilfully killed by military 
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Country 
 
Year 
 
Commission 
 
Result 
police, 1992 
 
Mexico 
 
1992 
 
National human rights 
commission 
 
Reported on various 
disappearances 
 
Nicaragua 
 
1992 
 
Tripartite commission 
 
Reported deaths of ten members 
of former opposition 
 
Togo 
 
1992 
 
National human rights 
commission 
 
Said government forces 
responsible for 1991 killings 
 
Niger 
 
1992-
1993 
 
Human rights commission of 
the national conference 
 
Only some corruption cases 
investigated 
 
Ethiopia 
 
1992 
 
Special public prosecutor 
 
Dozens of perpetrators charged 
in early 1995 
 
Sudan 
 
1992-
1994 
 
Commission of inquiry into 
government violence 
(Previous regime) 
 
Report on incidents in Juba to be 
published 
 
Thailand 
 
1992 
 
Ministry of Defense inquiry 
into killings and 
disappearances during 
demonstrations in May 1992 
 
Report not made public 
 
El Salvador 
 
1993-
1994 
 
Joint investigation 
committee on illegal armed 
groups 
 
Reported many killings had  
political background; 
perpetrators mentioned in 
confidential appendix 
 
Zimbabwe 
 
1993 
 
Human rights commission to 
investigate violations under 
present and previous 
governments 
 
In progress 
 
Ghana 
 
 1993-
1994 
 
Commission on human 
rights and administrative 
justice 
 
Failed investigation into killings 
of early 1980s 
 
Burundi 
 
1993 
 
Commission to investigate Commission apparently never 
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Country 
 
Year 
 
Commission 
 
Result 
killings in coup attempt  
1993 
started work 
 
Honduras 
 
1993 
 
National commissioner for 
the protection of human 
rights 
 
Report named those responsible 
for 1984 disappearances 
 
Malawi  
 
1994 
 
Commission of inquiry into 
political killings of early 
1980s 
 
In progress 
 
Sri Lanka 
 
1994 
 
Three commissions to 
investigate killings and 
disappearances since 1988 
 
In progress 
 
South 
Africa 
 
1995 
 
Truth and Reconciliation 
Commission 
 
Investigation of 30 years of 
apartheid regime violence and 
counter-violence.  Report 
published 1998 
 
Guatemala 
 
1995 
 
Commission of elucidation 
 
Investigated human rights 
violations and acts of violence 
 
Bolivia 
 
1982 
 
Commission of inquiry into 
disappearances 
 
No report 
 
Israel 
 
1982-
1983 
 
Commission of inquiry into 
killings in Sabra and Chatila 
 
Report said no direct 
responsibility but urged 
measures against certain 
officials 
 
Argentina 
 
1983-
1985 
 
Commission on the 
disappearance of persons 
(Sabato Commission) 
 
Nunca Mas report documented 
nearly 9,000 disappeared, 
analyzed repression apparatus 
 
Guinea 
 
1985 
 
Commission of inquiry 
 
No report 
 
Uruguay 
 
1985 
 
Parliamentary investigative 
commission on 'disappeared' 
persons 
 
Report published, no details of 
individual cases 
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Country 
 
Year 
 
Commission 
 
Result 
Zimbabwe 1985 Commission of inquiry into 
Matabele land murders by 
North Korean 5th Brigade 
during early years of Pres. 
Mugabe's rule 
Report kept confidential, amidst 
churches' and public's demand 
for its release 
 
Philippines 
 
1986-
1987 
 
Presidential committee on 
human rights 
 
Report not completed 
 
Chile 
 
1990-
1991 
 
National commission on 
truth and reconciliation 
 
Extensive report documented 
2,100 cases, analysed repression 
apparatus, many 
recommendations for reparation 
and rehabilitation 
 
Chad 
 
1991-
1992 
 
Commission of inquiry on 
crimes by ex-president 
Habre and others 
 
Report said 40,000 were killed, 
details on 4,000 cases named 
perpetrators 
 
Czech 
Republic 
 
1991 
 
Parliamentary commission 
on lustration law 
 
Some 200,000 individuals asked 
for certificate of clean record 
 
Sri Lanka 
 
1991 
 
Presidential commission of 
inquiry 
 
No report published 
 
Germany 
 
1992, 
1995 
 
Parliamentary commissions 
of inquiry to study effects of 
communist party, ideology 
and security apparatus 
 
Analytical history of 150,000 
pages, files opened for 
individual requests 
 
Poland 
 
1992 
 
Inquiry by the Ministry of 
the Interior 
 
Secret list of 64 names leaked to 
press, then discredited 
 
Bulgaria 
 
1992 
 
Temporary commission of 
inquiry on the Communist 
Party 
 
No report 
 
Romania 
 
1992 
 
Parliamentary commission of 
inquiry 
 
Two reports published 
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Country 
 
Year 
 
Commission 
 
Result 
Albania 1992 Commission on killings by 
security apparatus in 
Shkoder 1944-1991 
Six mass graves discovered, 
2,000 victims reported 
 
Chile 
 
1992 
 
National corporation for 
reparation and rehabilitation 
 
Ongoing investigation into 
killings and disappearances 
 
El Salvador 
 
1992 
 
Ad hoc commission on the 
military 
 
Confidential report 
recommended dismissal of 100 
military officers for human 
rights violations 
 
El Salvador 
 
1992-
1993 
 
UN Commission of truth 
 
Report said 60,900 killed, of 
which 5% by opposition; named 
perpetrators 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source:  Human Sciences Research Council, 
http://www.hsrc.ac.za/corporate/InFocus/May98/truthcomm.htm. 
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